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We conducted phylogenetic and epidemiologic analyses 
to determine sources of outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian 
inﬂ  uenza virus (HPAIV), subtype H5N1, in poultry holdings 
in 2007 in Germany, and a suspected incursion of HPAIV 
into the food chain through contaminated deep-frozen duck 
carcasses. In summer 2007, HPAIV (H5N1) outbreaks in 3 
poultry holdings in Germany were temporally, spatially, and 
phylogenetically linked to outbreaks in wild aquatic birds. 
Detection of HPAIV (H5N1) in frozen duck carcass samples 
of retained slaughter batches of 1 farm indicated that silent 
infection had occurred for some time before the incidental 
detection. Phylogenetic analysis established a direct 
epidemiologic link between HPAIV isolated from duck meat 
and strains isolated from 3 further outbreaks in December 
2007 in backyard chickens that had access to uncooked offal 
from commercial deep-frozen duck carcasses. Measures 
that will prevent such undetected introduction of HPAIV 
(H5N1) into the food chain are urgently required.
H
ighly pathogenic avian inﬂ   uenza (HPAI) causes a 
substantial proportion of deaths in susceptible poultry 
species, which potentially lead to severe economic losses 
(1). Some HPAI viruses (HPAIV), in particular HPAIV 
of subtype H5N1 of Asian origin (2), exhibit a zoonotic 
potential, causing rare, but often fatal disease, in humans.
Since this virus was ﬁ  rst detected in southern People’s 
Republic of China in 1996, descendants of this virus 
have spread among poultry in 3 continents; as yet, only 
the Americas and Australia have been avoided. In an 
unprecedented scenario, wild birds have also been widely 
affected by HPAIV (H5N1) and are believed to have 
contributed to its transcontinental spread (3). In central 
Europe, HPAIV (H5N1) infections were encountered for 
the ﬁ  rst time in winter 2005–06 and spring 2006, when 
mainly wild birds, but also a few isolated poultry holdings, 
were affected. Since August 2006, the virus seemed to have 
disappeared, but it reemerged in January and February 
2007 in Hungary and the United Kingdom (4). All of these 
outbreaks were attributable to virus strains of phyloclusters 
2.2, groups A and B, which originated from unknown 
sources but had phylogenetic links to viruses isolated during 
outbreaks of HPAI among wild birds at Lake Qinghai in 
northwestern China in 2005 (4,5–8).
In July and August 2007, introduction of yet another 
Qinghai-like subcluster of subtype H5N1 viruses, 
designated 2.2 group C, led to additional cases, ﬁ  rst in 
poultry in the Czech Republic and later in wild birds in 
France and Germany. In Germany, outbreaks also occurred 
in several poultry holdings, including 2 large duck-
fattening farms. However, the infected ducks did not show 
clinical symptoms indicative of avian inﬂ  uenza, and no 
overt excess daily deaths were observed in these holdings. 
Outbreaks in poultry were spatially and temporally linked 
to cases in wild birds. Control measures included the 
culling of >750,000 animals (9). These measures seemed 
to contain the outbreaks because no more cases became 
apparent after August 2007. Phylogenetic studies indicated 
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that these outbreaks had a common, as yet unidentiﬁ  ed, 
source (7).
In December 2007, HPAIV (H5N1) was detected 
in 3 isolated backyard holdings in the Federal State of 
Brandenburg in northeastern Germany, although no 
concomitant cases of subtype H5N1 infection had been 
detected in wild birds or in poultry since August 2007. This 
puzzling situation prompted detailed ﬁ  eld epidemiologic 
investigations. These investigations, corroborated by 
results from wild bird monitoring and from phylogenetic 
analysis of the respective viruses, indicate that wild birds 
can be ruled out with high reliability as a source of infection 
in these cases. Instead, infected duck meat, possibly 
originating from the German duck-fattening farms affected 
by the outbreaks in August 2007, might have caused these 
cases.
Materials and Methods
Detection of Virus
RNA from swab samples or tissues was isolated by 
manual (Viral RNA Kit; QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany, and 
Tecan Evo 3000 System; Macherey-Nagel, Düren, Germany) 
procedures. One-step real-time reverse transcription–PCR 
(rRT-PCR), which speciﬁ  cally  ampliﬁ   ed fragments of 
the avian inﬂ  uenza virus (AIV) M, H5, H7, or N1 genes, 
was performed as reported in European Commission (EC) 
decision 2006/437/EC. Pathogenicity assessments were 
based on molecular analysis of the H5 cleavage site by 
either rRT-PCR (10) or sequencing (11). Virus isolation 
was performed in the amnioallantoic cavity of 9- to 11-day-
old embryonated hens’ eggs.
Nucleotide Sequencing of Virus Genes
RNA was prepared from allantoic ﬂ  uid of inoculated 
embryonated hens’ eggs. Generation of full-length gene 
ampliﬁ  cation products of the hemagglutinin (HA) gene and 
sequencing were performed as previously described (7). 
Sequences are publicly available from GenBank: R1359/07-
AM 749 443; R1349/07-AM 749 442; R1393/07-AM 773 
724; R1400, 1406, 1772, 1779, 1797, 2048/07-AM 914 
004/012/014/016/021/026; R3234, 3272, 3294/07-FM 177 
119/127/135; and R3248, 3249/07-FM 163 440/448.
Phylogenetic Analyses
Sequences of full-length HA genes were aligned 
by using the multiple sequence comparison by log-
expectation (MUSCLE) method (www.ebi.ac.uk/Tools/
muscle/index.html) and were then subjected to distance 
matrix calculations (FastME; 12). Minimal-evolution (ME) 
trees were built by using the default options of FastME 
(balanced greedy minimal evolution to build the initial tree 
and balanced nearest-neighbor interchanges for swapping 
and optimization). In addition, maximum-likelihood (ML) 
analysis (TreePuzzle; 13) was performed by using the public 
Phylemon server (http://phylemon.bioinfo.cipf.es/cgi-bin/
tools.cgi). One thousand (ME) or 200 (ML) bootstrapping 
cycles were performed.
Serologic Testing
Poultry serum specimens from affected and in-contact 
holdings were screened by using commercially available 
competitive ELISA (cEIA) kits that detect antibodies 
speciﬁ   c for the nucleocapsid protein (Pourquier AI A 
Blocking ELISA; Institut Pourquier, Montpellier, France, 
or ID Screen Inﬂ   uenza A NP Antibody Competition 
ELISA; ID VET, Montpellier, France) according to the 
manufacturers’ instructions. Internal validation data 
showed that performance characteristics of these 2 
assays were largely comparable with those of duck sera. 
Consequently, they were used interchangeably in the 
different laboratories. Positive serum specimens were 
further analyzed by hemagglutination inhibition (HI) 
assay according to 2006/437/EC. Antigens prepared from 
subtypes H5N2 (A/ostrich/Denmark/72420/96; Veterinary 
Laboratories Agency [VLA], Weybridge, UK), H5N1 
(NIBRG14, NIBSc, UK), and H7N7 (A/tk/England/647/77; 
VLA) viruses were used.
Results
Outbreak Detection and Field Epidemiologic 
Investigations
Bavaria
In an industrial duck-fattening farm (farm A) in 
Bavaria, Germany, a slight increase of daily mortality 
rates ranging from 0.7% to 1.8% from August 19, 2007, 
onward was registered in barn A/15, which prompted swab 
sampling on August 22, 2007 (Table). Although initially 
Riemerella spp. were detected, differential diagnostic 
measures included PCRs for AIV (H5N1), which yielded 
positive results. HPAIV (H5N1) was ﬁ  nally conﬁ  rmed on 
August 25, 2007, which led to the culling of all 170,000 
ducks kept at that time at farm A. Further sampling at 
culling led to detection of HPAIV (H5N1) in 3 other barns 
of farm A (nos. 10, 12, and 13; Table).
Farm A also operated a large regional poultry abattoir. 
Thus, a considerable number of contact farms, most of them 
keeping ducks for fattening, including farms B and C, were 
identiﬁ  ed. Except for farms B and C, no clinical, virologic, 
or serologic evidence for spread of virus was obtained in 
monitoring investigations. Farms B and C were serviced by 
the same crew of poultry workers and, hence, were treated 
as a single epidemiologic unit. No clinical evidence for an 
HPAIV infection was obtained on August 28, 2007, and 
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an initial virologic investigation of 60 oropharyngeal and 
cloacal swabs yielded negative results. However, residual 
lung tissues obtained from 2 retained frozen carcasses 
of ducks that had been reared at farm B (barn B/3–5) 
and slaughtered at the abattoir at farm A on August 1, 
2008, tested positive for HPAIV (H5N1) (Table). In this 
fattening ﬂ  ock, a slightly increased cumulative proportion 
of deaths (8.3%) was evident (Figure 1, panel B). After 
these ﬁ  ndings, swab sampling was increased to 450 per 
barn unit at farms B and C to ensure detection of HPAIV 
infection at a prevalence of 1% with 99% conﬁ  dence. In 
addition, serologic surveillance was initiated. No evidence 
for any infection by AIV H5 was found at farm C (Table). 
Farm B, however, housed at least 1 ﬂ  ock of ducks ready 
for slaughter and marketing (Table: B/2–4) that showed 
serologic evidence for widespread infection with AIV H5. 
In 4 oropharyngeal swabs of this ﬂ  ock, low genome loads 
of AIV (H5N1) were detected; 2 swabs yielded sufﬁ  cient 
material to conﬁ  rm, by sequencing, the presence of HPAIV. 
The low prevalence of active viral infection contrasted the 
high H5-speciﬁ  c seroprevalence, which indicated that the 
peak of infection in this ﬂ  ock had passed probably 2–3 weeks 
before swabbing for virologic testing had been initiated on 
September 5, 2007 (Table). The overall cumulative losses 
in this ﬂ  ock nevertheless amounted to only 5.9% (Table; 
Figure 1, panel D). The culling of poultry on farms B and 
C was completed on September 10, 2007, and all poultry 
of farms B and C slaughtered after July 31, 2007, at the 
abattoir at farm A were conﬁ  scated and destroyed.
Retrospective analysis of duck deaths at farm B showed 
modestly enhanced cumulative values in at least 3 fattening 
ﬂ  ocks during midterm or toward the end of the fattening 
period (Table; Figure 1, panels A–C). Virologically, HPAIV 
(H5N1)–positive animals were detected retrospectively 
in barn B/3–5, which had hatched on June 20, 2007, and 
showed a cumulative proportion of deaths of 8.3% (Table; 
Figure 1, panel B). Inconclusive results were obtained for 
the ﬂ  ock that had hatched on June 29, 2007 (Table; Figure 
1, panel C). Another suspected fattening ﬂ  ock (hatching 
date April 25, 2007; Table; Figure 1, panel A) could not 
be retrospectively analyzed. In none of these ﬂ  ocks did 
daily mortality rates exceed 2%, the legal cut-off for 
mandatory targeted etiologic investigations including for 
avian inﬂ  uenza viruses. However, cumulative proportion 
of deaths amounted to up to 20.3%.
Brandenburg
On December 10, 2007, three of 11 chickens were 
found dead at a backyard holding in the Federal State of 
Brandenburg in northeastern Germany. Another chicken 
had died on December 7, and a reduction in egg production 
on the farm was observed. HPAIV (H5N1) was detected 
in 2 birds submitted for pathologic and laboratory testing 
on December 11. Clinical signs in the chickens that were 
274  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 2, February 2009
Table. Summary of investigations for HPAIV (H5N1) infections in industrial duck-fattening farms A, B, and C by rRT-PCR, sequencing
and serologic analyses, Germany, 2007* 
Farm/barn 
unit
Date of 
housing Herd size 
Date of 
culling
Cumulative
proportion of 
deaths, % 
Duckling
age, d  Swab samples†
Serum
samples‡
Tissue
samples†
A/10 13 Jul  12,015 25 Aug  14.4§ 43 50/6 (25 Aug)  30/30/6 –
A/12 16 Jul  39,165 26 Aug  12.5 41 50/39 (25 Aug)  30/13/1 –
A/13 13 Jul  14,000 25 Aug  14.4§ 43 50/23 (25 Aug)  30/30/4 –
A/15 1 Aug  45,696 25 Aug  10.2 25 25/13 (22 Aug)  – –
B/1-1 29 Jun  32,540 11 Aug¶ 20.3 (Figure 1, 
panel C) 
43 – – 7/(1)
B/1-1 14 Aug  35,175 9 Aug  ND 24 519/0 (5 Sep)  106/5/0 –
B/1-2 17 Aug  35,000 9 Aug  ND 21 511/0 (5 Sep)  109/5/0 –
B/2-4 20 Jul  35,860 9 Sep  5.9 (Figure 1, 
panel D) 
50 511/6# (5 Sep)  126/105/52 122/1
B/3-5 25 Apr  22,550 14 Jun¶ 12.6 (Figure 1, 
panel A) 
50 – – –
B/3-5 20 Jun  36,300 8 Jan¶ 8.3 (Figure 1, 
panel B) 
42 – – 34/2
B/3-5 7 Aug  35,860 9 Oct  2.4 34 515/0 (5 Sep)  125/3/0 –
B/3-6 10 Aug  34,650 9 Oct  1.2 31 519/0 (5 Sep)  130/1/0 –
C 19 Jul  28,000 9 Oct  2.2 52 515/0 (5 Sep)  91/3/0 –
*HPAIV, highly pathogenic avian influenza; rRT-PCR, real-time reverse transcription–PCR; ND, no data available. 
†Total number of samples (oropharyngeal swabs; lung and central nervous system tissues) examined by rRT-PCR and sequencing/no. of  subtype H5N1-
positive samples; date of swab collection is indicated in parentheses. 
‡Total number of serum samples examined/nos. positive for nucleocapsid protein–specific antibodies/nos. positive in H5-specific hemagglutination 
inhibition assay (titer t16). 
§Combined data on proportion of deaths for barns A/10 and A/13; increased losses in barn A/10 occurred after early August 2007.
#Date of regular slaughter. HPAIV (H5N1) was found in retained frozen duck carcasses of flocks B/3–5 (hatched 6/20/07) and subtype H5N1–specific 
RNA was present in 1 frozen duck carcass of flock B/1–1 (hatched 6/29/07), but the sample could not be pathotyped due to low viral genome loads.  
¶Due to low viral loads the H5N1 pathotype could be confirmed by sequencing a hemaglutinin fragment in only 2 cases. HPAIV in Duck Carcasses, Germany
still alive on December 12 and 13 included lethargy, rufﬂ  ed 
feathers, reduced mobility, and cyanosis of the combs and 
wattles. Two of these birds died on December 12, and 
another 3 died on December 13. The remaining chicken 
was culled on December 14 after HPAIV (H5N1) had been 
conﬁ  rmed in samples submitted to the national reference 
laboratory on that day. Two more cases of HPAIV (H5N1) 
infection in similar backyard chicken holdings were 
detected on December 20 and 23, 2007, respectively, in the 
same region but separated by 80–120 km.
No direct connections between these holdings were 
identiﬁ  ed. As judged from the lack of recent movements 
of animals, vehicle trafﬁ  c, and contacts of owners, no hints 
toward an incursion or further spread of virus was evident 
through these routes. Holdings were situated in areas rich 
in migratory birds. In addition, only 1 further condition 
appeared to be shared between these holdings: Within 2 to 
4 days before the outbreaks, the chickens had access to raw 
offal of deep-frozen duck carcasses that had been purchased 
from a supermarket chain in October in that region. These 
ducks had been frozen and were consumed just 3–5 days 
before the outbreaks. Owners of the third holding refused 
to make any speciﬁ  c comments concerning this point, but 
circumstantial evidence points toward a similar scenario. 
At the time of investigation, no further material from any 
of these deep-frozen duck carcasses was available for 
analysis.
Outbreak-associated Surveillance Activities
Bavaria
From January 1, 2007, until August 31, 2007, a total of 
1,236 wild birds were tested in Bavaria for avian inﬂ  uenza 
viruses. From June 24 through August 3, 2007, HPAIV 
(H5N1) was detected in 19 aquatic birds (mute swans, gray 
lag and Canada geese, tufted ducks). Extensive serologic 
(2,107 samples) and virologic (5,833 samples) surveillance 
in altogether 46 further contact holdings to farm A 
extending over the whole area of Germany did not yield 
any indication of past or ongoing AIV H5 infections.
Brandenburg
In 2007, a total of 1,696 wild birds were tested in 
Brandenburg for avian inﬂ  uenza virus. In December 2007 
and in January 2008, 283 and 162 wild birds, respectively, 
were tested with negative results. HPAIV (H5N1) was not 
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 15, No. 2, February 2009  275 
Figure 1. Deaths of ducks in different barn units of farm B, Bavaria. A) Barn B/3–5; duck hatched April 25, 2007, slaughtered June 14, 
2007, at an abattoir in Lower Saxony: no material available for testing. B) Barn B/3–5; duck hatched June 20, 2007, slaughtered August 
1, 2007, at farm A): 2 highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza virus (HPAIV) A (H5N1)–positive samples detected in retained samples of frozen 
duck carcasses; virologic and serologic results suggestive of a recent HPAIV (H5N1) infection are listed in the Table. C) Barn B/1–1; duck 
hatched June 29, 2007, slaughtered August 11, 2007, at farm A; subtype H5N1–speciﬁ  c RNA was detected in 1 retained sample of a 
frozen duck carcass, but the pathotype could not be determined due to low viral loads. D) Barn B/2–4; duck hatched July 20, 2007, culled 
September 9, 2007; virologic and serologic results suggestive of a recent HPAIV (H5N1) infection are listed in the Table.  RESEARCH
detected in any of the samples. Serologic testing of 4,040 
blood samples and virologic testing of 2,836 swab samples 
from poultry had negative results for subtype H5N1 in 
2007.
Phylogenetic Analyses
The HA gene of 1 representative virus isolate of each 
of the 3 Brandenburg holdings and of the virus isolated 
from duck meat were sequenced. Sequence comparisons 
showed a very close relationship between viruses from the 
3 Brandenburg holdings and from the Bavarian duck meat. 
Within the HA gene, complete identity was found between 
2 viruses in the Brandenburg holdings and the virus in duck 
meat; the third Brandenburg virus was distinguished by a 
single nonsynonymous mutation (K65R).
Phylogenetic analysis of the full-length HA gene of 
these and other HPAIV (H5N1) viruses isolated in 2007 
in Germany and neighboring countries is presented in 
Figure 2. All viruses belonged to cluster 2.2, group C. This 
lineage had not been detected during the 2006 outbreaks 
among wild birds in Germany and, therefore, most likely 
represents a new incursion in 2007 (7). Viruses from the 
Bavarian holding A clustered separately from those of the 
Bavarian holding B. Brandenburg viruses A–C clustered 
with the virus sequences from duck meat originating from 
Bavarian holding B (Figure 2).
Discussion
The high homology of RNA sequences of the HA genes 
derived from viruses that caused outbreaks at 3 different 
holdings in the German Federal State of Brandenburg 
and virus isolated from deep-frozen duck carcasses (A/
duck meat/Bavaria/2048/2007) clearly points to a close 
epidemiologic link between these outbreaks. According 
to theoretical consideration regarding the mutation rate of 
inﬂ  uenza A viruses (14) and to practical experiences during 
outbreaks (4), if HPAIV had gone through a transmission 
chain consisting of several hosts, more extensive sequence 
differences would likely have resulted. This likelihood is 
further emphasized by the comparison of 3 subtype H5N1 
virus isolates derived from a single barn of farm A (Figure 
2); these viruses exhibit greater variability among each 
other than do viruses from the 3 different affected backyard 
holdings in Brandenburg. Also, distinct sequences of 
viruses were detected from poultry in Poland, where 
outbreaks occurred at the same time as the Brandenburg 
cases, which renders an incursion from this source highly 
unlikely. Among the Brandenburg cases, no epidemiologic 
links could be detected except that, as proven in 2 cases 
and assumed to have occurred in the third case, backyard 
chickens had access to uncooked offal from duck meat 
purchased separately in different supermarkets of the same 
national chain.
Oral uptake of virus is an efﬁ  cient way of transmitting 
HPAIV among poultry and mammals (15,16). Infectious 
virus in titers of up to 107.2 50% egg infectious doses per 
gram in muscles of infected chickens, ducks, and quails has 
been repeatedly demonstrated (17,18). Although feeding of 
poultry offal to poultry or livestock is legally prohibited 
in Germany, unintended access of backyard poultry to 
poultry meat and organs is sometimes possible. If such 
offal is contaminated with HPAIV, transmission becomes 
possible, and isolated outbreaks like those reported from 
Brandenburg may ensue. However, this circumstance 
would require the presence of HPAIV in meat destined for 
human consumption. This possibility had previously been 
estimated to be low (19).
Unfortunately, no experimental evidence could be 
produced that unequivocally links the Bavarian farm B 
and Brandenburg backyard outbreaks because no material 
was left for virologic examination from the suspected 
deep-frozen duck carcasses. Therefore, we tried to collect 
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Figure 2. Phylogenetic tree of the hemagglutinin 
(HA) gene (full-length sequence) of highly 
pathogenic avian inﬂ   uenza virus (HPAIV) 
(H5N1) detected in poultry from Brandenburg 
and Bavaria, Germany, in 2007, including 
sequences of wild birds and poultry from 
neighboring countries. Sequence of the Czech 
poultry isolate is supported by GenBank. The tree 
was constructed by using a minimal-evolution 
algorithm; numbers represent bootstrap values 
after 1,000 replications. A maximum-likelihood 
(ML)–based tree resulted in a similar topology; 
italicized numbers indicate bootstrap values of 
the ML tree after 200 replications. Scale bar 
indicates substitutions per site. The HA sequence 
of A/chicken/Czech Republic/11242–38/2007 
(H5N1) was extracted from GenBank accession 
no. EU 443553. LPAIV, low pathogenicity avian 
inﬂ  uenza virus. HPAIV in Duck Carcasses, Germany
further epidemiologic data by fully retracing the origin of 
the frozen ducks purchased by the owners of the backyard 
chickens in Brandenburg. This attempt included authorities 
in the involved Federal States and the management of the 
supermarket chain that had sold the duck meat.
The duck meat sold in autumn 2007 by the supermarket 
chain in Brandenburg and in the neighboring Federal States 
of Berlin and Mecklenburg–Western Pomerania had been 
purchased from a slaughterhouse in the Federal State 
of Lower Saxony (lots 724, 725; Figure 3). Direct links 
between Bavarian farm B and the slaughterhouse in Lower 
Saxony existed because slaughtering lots 724 and 725 
included ducks from 3 fattening ﬂ  ocks from farm B. These 
ducks were slaughtered on June 14, 19, and 22, 2007, in 
the abattoir in Lower Saxony, because the most frequently 
used abattoir in Bavaria at farm A was closed for holidays 
(Figure 3). Among the 3 ﬂ  ocks was the one from barn 
B/3–5, which showed a suspiciously elevated cumulative 
proportion of deaths of 12.6% (Table; Figure 1, panel A).
This circumstantial evidence points toward a transient 
and limited incursion of HPAIV (H5N1) into duck meat 
destined for human consumption. Therefore, enhanced 
virologic screening of fattening ducks has been initiated in 
Germany. Also, reporting obligations related to deaths in 
duck ﬂ  ocks were adopted. Since the end of the Brandenburg 
outbreaks, a single, unrelated reccurrence of HPAIV 
(H5N1) in Germany was detected in poultry in 2008, but 
none has been detected in wild birds. To date, no clinical 
cases of human infection with subtype H5N1 have been 
reported in Germany.
In avian hosts, the clinical picture of an HPAIV 
infection depends, among other factors, on the species 
affected (20). In particular, domestic waterfowl showed 
substantial variations in clinical features resulting from 
infection with strains of HPAIV (H5N1) of Asian origin 
(21). Factors inﬂ   uencing the clinical course relate to 
species, age of animals, and the virus strain (22,23). The 
cited experimental data as well as reported evidence from 
the ﬁ  eld (24) show that an introduction and subsequent 
spread of HPAIV (H5N1) in duck ﬂ  ocks is likely clinically 
silent. Also in the cases reported here, hardly any clinical 
symptoms suggestive of an HPAIV infection, in particular, 
neurologic manifestations, were evident. Increased 
proportion of deaths, as seen in some of the described duck-
fattening ﬂ  ocks, might have been fueled by bacterial co-
infections, e.g., by those caused by Riemerella spp. Through 
silently but productively infected ducks, an endemic 
status of HPAIV (H5N1) infection can be established 
and perpetuated (25). Strains isolated from such endemic 
infections induce no clinical symptoms in ducks but retain 
high pathogenicity for chickens and turkeys. No sign of 
even widespread infection would be clinically apparent until 
the virus has become more established in ﬂ  ocks of highly 
vulnerable (gallinaceous) species (26). Such mechanisms 
are obviously not restricted to subtropical Southeast Asia.
In conclusion, our data show that incursions of recent 
strains of descendants of Qinghai lineage HPAIV (H5N1) 
strains into industrial duck-fattening holdings in Europe 
may be clinically silent, even in young ducklings. If daily 
mortality rates remain low, an increase in cumulative 
mortality may still be evident and should prompt speciﬁ  c 
virologic investigations. Undetected HPAIV (H5N1) 
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Figure 3. Possible pathway of transmission of highly pathogenic 
avian inﬂ  uenza virus (HPAIV) (H5N1) from farm B, Bavaria, to 3 
backyard chicken holdings in Brandenburg (gray house symbols) 
based on phylogenetic and circumstantial epidemiologic evidence. 
Viruses of these cases were virtually identical, although they were 
separated by 4 months (August and December, 2007) and ≈400 
km without linking outbreaks. In contrast, other viruses occurring 
at the same time (August) in Bavaria in wild birds or in farm A 
were distinguishable from those of farm B. The same was true for 
viruses detected in Poland (close to Brandenburg) in December. 
Therefore, a direct epidemiologic link between farm B and the 
outbreaks in Brandenburg was suspected (dashed arrow). From 
June 14 through June 22, 2007, three fattening ﬂ  ocks from farm B 
were slaughtered in Lower Saxony (angled arrow). These included 
ﬂ   ock B/3-5 with elevated proportion of deaths (Figure 1, panel 
A). Slaughtering lots 724/725, which contained ducks from farm 
B ﬂ  ocks with an elevated cumulative proportion of deaths, were 
distributed in Brandenburg supermarkets (horizontal arrow). Frozen 
duck carcasses from these lots had been purchased by the owners 
of the Brandenburg chicken holdings, and in 2 of the 3 outbreaks, 
owners admitted that chickens had access to uncooked offal from 
these carcasses before the outbreaks.RESEARCH
infections of domestic waterfowl destined for human 
consumption raises the risk for human infection when 
infected birds or contaminated meat products are handled. 
Thus, measures must be strengthened that can prevent 
this zooanthroponotic virus from entering the food chain 
through contaminated duck meat products and spreading 
further. Intensiﬁ  ed monitoring of duck herds for HPAIV 
infection that does not rely on syndromic surveillance 
would be required ﬁ  rst. In the outbreaks reported here, 
the power of serologic assays to detect virus incursions 
is notable, compared with results by rRT-PCR. Species-
independent cEIA assays detecting antibodies speciﬁ  c for 
the nucleocapsid protein of inﬂ  uenza A viruses were more 
sensitive than HI assays that used 2 different H5 antigens. 
Despite the intrinsically higher sensitivity of most ELISAs, 
the discrepancy in this study might have been aggravated 
by not using antigen of the outbreak viruses in HI assays. 
Nevertheless, cEIAs would be suitable for high-throughput 
analysis in extensive monitoring programs while HI 
techniques would not.
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